Time can help us realize that ideas we thought were good in the moment, really weren’t. This article is about one such case.
One of Major League Baseball’s top ongoing news items this past off-season was the slow free agent market – especially for mid-tier players. Never before had no many good talents remained unsigned so late.
By the time pitchers and catchers reported in February, the sheer volume of players still looking for homes led me to consider making the acquisition of such free agents the core of my draft strategy.
I should mention that I am playing in National League-only formats.
The primary risk inherent in such an approach is accurately assessing the possibility that the free agent later signs with a team in the other league. In that case, the player becomes ineligible and must be released immediately, with the money spent on draft day lost.
But what if one could make a set of league destination predictions that would later be proven to be better than 50 percent?
And what if the inherent uncertainty surrounding these free agents deflate their draft day prices to less than 50 percent of my forecasted values?
If I could benefit from both dimensions, I might be able to gain an edge in an area that others were likely to be shying away from.
As you may have already imagined, the execution did not go as smoothly as the plan.
While I started with a long list of candidates, players were coming to terms with clubs on an almost daily basis, shrinking the applicable pool.
Further, the “best” industry projections on where free agents would sign were completely undependable. For example, almost every supposedly knowledgeable source I referenced had Eric Hosmer and Yu Darvish returning to the American League. Neither did. And they are far from the only such examples.
I also did not have exclusive ownership of the strategy.
In fact, by late March when NL Tout Wars drafted, then-still unsigned Jake Arrieta went for full value. Multiple bidders were confident enough to essentially disregard the veteran’s apparent uncertain contract status. My hope of rostering the former-Cub, soon-to-be Philly at less than 50 cents on the dollar was pure folly.
But the most damning critique of my ill-advised strategy came from the players themselves.
While there are many major leaguers experiencing sub-par starts here in 2018, there seems a higher proportion of strugglers among the late signers.
Prominent examples include Alex Cobb, Lance Lynn, Greg Holland, Neil Walker and Logan Morrison. For them financially, it did not go well, either. In fact, the first three turned down a qualifying offer from their prior team. In doing so, not only did they pass on a guaranteed one-year deal for $17.4 million, the cost of a compensatory draft pick that immediately became attached to them became an anchor, dragging against their signing.
In the spirit of full disclosure, I did draft Holland in both NL LABR (early March) and NL Tout (late March) for a total of just $5. Imagine my delight when the closer who saved a co-NL best 41 games last season signed with an NL team that had a job opening – during the first weekend of the schedule.
My gloating soon turned to remorse then anger and finally shame, as the former Rockies closer essentially became unusable. With seemingly no other choice, the Cardinals placed Holland on the disabled list with an injury, real or imagined.
Refusing to admit my mistake, I stayed with Holland too long before dropping him. By then, I had absorbed almost two months of atrocious pitching. Specifically, Holland had a 9.45 ERA, 2.625 WHIP, no wins and no saves.
Based on how long I blindly held on to an obviously-failing Holland, it is much better I did not own a roster full of players with a similar profile.
Once again, fate saved me from myself!
Brian Walton was the 2009 National League Tout Wars champion, scoring the most points in the league’s history. He also holds the all-time NL Tout single-season records for wins and saves. His work can also be found daily at TheCardinalNation.com. Follow Brian on Twitter.
